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Affiliate-level evidence indicates that American multinational firms circumvent 
capital controls by adjusting their reported intrafirm trade, affiliate profitability, and 
dividend repatriations.  As a result, the reported profit impact of local capital controls is 
comparable to the effect of 24 percent higher corporate tax rates, and affiliates located in 
countries imposing capital controls are 9.8 percent more likely than other affiliates to 
remit dividends to parent companies.  Multinational affiliates located in countries with 
capital controls face 5.4 percent higher interest rates on local borrowing than do affiliates 
of the same parent borrowing locally in countries without capital controls.  Together, the 
costliness of avoidance and higher interest rates raise the cost of capital, significantly 
reducing the level of foreign direct investment.  American affiliates are 13-16 percent 
smaller in countries with capital controls than they are in comparable countries without 
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1. Introduction 
Countries that fear the economic disruptions that may accompany capital flows are often 
tempted to impose controls on international capital movements.  These controls can take many 
forms, and their efficacy in promoting or deterring growth is hotly debated.  The same countries 
are also typically eager to attract foreign direct investment due to the presumed salutary effects 
of such investment.  The potential inconsistency of the desire to control capital movements and 
the desire to attract inbound foreign direct investment has heretofore received limited attention, 
in spite of its obvious policy relevance. 
This paper offers evidence of the effects of capital controls on foreign direct investment, 
in the process addressing several related questions: What is the effect of capital controls on the 
cost of capital for foreign investors?  Do multinational firms employ their internal product and 
capital markets to circumvent capital controls, and how do such efforts compare to actions 
triggered by income taxes?  Are the effects of capital controls reversed when countries liberalize 
their capital account restrictions?  And how much foreign direct investment does a country lose 
by imposing capital controls? 
The results indicate that local borrowing rates are considerably higher in countries 
imposing capital controls; that multinational firms distort reported trade patterns, profitability, 
and dividend repatriations in order to mitigate the impact of capital controls; and that the costs 
that must be incurred in order to avoid capital controls together with higher interest rates 
significantly reduce levels of foreign direct investment.  Borrowing rates are 5.4 percentage 
points higher in countries imposing capital controls than they are elsewhere for affiliates of the 
same multinational parents.  The distortions to reported profitability are comparable to those 
incurred in response to 24 percent differences in corporate tax rates, and dividend repatriations 
are regularized to facilitate the extraction of profits from countries imposing capital controls.  
The avoidance of capital controls and high interest rates impose costs on foreign affiliates and 
therefore reduce the volume of investment by American firms.  The initial capitalization of 
affiliates in countries with capital controls is 13–16 percent smaller than affiliates elsewhere and 
this smaller initial size is not offset by greater growth through increased profit retentions.  These 
patterns are reversed when capital controls are removed. 
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These results emerge from an analysis of how foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational 
firms respond to capital controls and their removal.  The use of confidential affiliate-level data 
makes it possible to distinguish the behavior of foreign affiliates of the same parent companies 
operating in markets with and without capital controls.  As a result, it is possible to obtain 
estimates of the impact of capital controls, while implicitly controlling for considerations that are 
common to all affiliates of the same company.  The sample, which varies depending on the 
analysis, covers the activities of all U.S. multinational firms from 1982 to 1997.   
Any analysis of firm-level responses to capital controls is complicated by two important 
considerations: capital controls are not randomly distributed among nations, and available 
indexes measure capital controls imprecisely.  This paper attempts to overcome these difficulties 
by focusing on subtle predictions regarding firm behavior and by employing a measure tailored 
to capture the aspects of capital controls relevant for multinational firms.  Although it is possible 
to control for observable country characteristics and firm fixed effects, the measured effect of 
capital controls on foreign investment may reflect the impact of omitted variables that affect 
investment and are correlated with the desire to control capital flows.  Since there is a shortage of 
available instruments for the imposition or removal of capital controls, it is useful to look beyond 
predictions of the effects of controls on levels of foreign direct investment and to consider 
subtler predictions regarding the avoidance behavior of American firms.  Consistent with these 
predictions, the evidence indicates that foreign affiliates in countries that control remittances are 
significantly more likely than other affiliates to smooth dividend repatriations, in spite of the 
associated tax and resource-allocation costs.  The same affiliates have 4.7 percent lower reported 
profit rates than do comparable affiliates in countries without capital controls, and exhibit 
intrafirm trade patterns that shift profits away from host countries restricting capital flows, this 
behavior characteristic of affiliates located in countries with high tax rates.  While it is 
impossible to rule out the confounding effects of the non-random assignment of capital controls, 
the tests suggest that the overall results do not merely reflect the conditions that give rise to the 
desire to impose capital controls.     
Studies of capital controls and capital account liberalizations are also commonly 
hampered by the imprecise measurement of capital controls.  As noted in Edison et al. (2003), 
measures employed in empirical work on capital controls typically are blunt.  In order to address 
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this problem, the empirical work in this paper employs a measure of capital account restrictions 
that is specifically associated with the activities of multinational firms, comparing the results to 
those obtained using a widely-adopted measure of capital account restrictions developed by the 
International Monetary Fund.  This analysis of firm responses to capital account restrictions 
offers the advantage of being closely tied to the restrictions that firms actually face.  As it 
happens, results obtained using the two control measures are consistent, though stronger when 
using the measure of capital controls tailored for situations facing multinational firms. 
Section 2 of the paper reviews the empirical literature on the impact of capital account 
restrictions and liberalizations and ties the paper’s results to the open questions in the literature.  
Section 3 offers an overview of the available data and describes aggregate patterns of 
multinational activity and capital account regulations.  Section 4 presents empirical evidence of 
the effects of capital account restrictions on local interest rates, profit extraction, and investment 
levels.  Section 5 is the conclusion. 
2. Capital Controls, Liberalizations and Economic Growth 
This section reviews the sizable macroeconomic and finance literature analyzing the 
effect of capital account restrictions on aggregate investment and the growing literature on the 
distributional consequences of capital account restrictions.  Evidence of the effects of capital 
account restrictions on the behavior of multinational firms is complementary to these research 
streams.  This section also examines the likely effects of capital controls on multinationals firms. 
2.1. Investment responses to capital controls and liberalizations 
Eichengreen (2002) provides an overview of the large literature on the aggregate effects 
of capital account liberalizations, concluding with the observation that liberalization “remains 
one of the most controversial and least understood policies of our day.”  While few definitive 
conclusions have emerged, two important viewpoints can be distinguished.  The skeptical view 
of capital account liberalization is most often associated with Rodrik (1998) and related work.  
Using the IMF classification of capital controls, Rodrik finds no significant statistical association 
between capital account openness and growth.  This evidence is used to bolster a more general 
skepticism regarding the virtues of financial openness in the world of the second-best, as in 
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Bhagwati (1998).  The more optimistic view of capital account liberalization is advanced by 
Fischer (1998), and supported by evidence provided in Quinn (1997).  Using an index 
subsequently adopted by many authors, Quinn reports a significant positive correlation between 
changes in his measure of capital account openness and subsequent economic growth. 
The salience of these issues for policy makers has motivated work attempting to 
disentangle the reasons for these contradictory findings.  In particular, researchers have focused 
on the distinctive nature of the IMF and Quinn measures (as in Edwards (2001)), the possibility 
that capital liberalization operates differently for countries of different income levels (as in 
Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), which can be compared to Grilli and Millesi-Ferreti 
(1995)), the role of preexisting policies and the role of sequencing in determining the effects of 
capital control liberalizations (as in Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) and Chinn and Ito 
(2002)), and the role of political institutions in dictating outcomes associated with capital 
account liberalizations (as in Quinn, Inclan and Toyoda (2001)).  The effect of capital account 
liberalizations in stimulating economic growth and investment remains an open question.        
Finance scholars have emphasized the effects of stock market liberalizations on 
investment using firm-level data.  Following the intuition of Stulz (1995, 1999), Henry (2000), 
Bekeart and Harvey (2000), and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2002) find that stock market 
liberalizations in a set of emerging market countries are followed by investment booms by local 
firms listed on equity markets.  Chari and Henry (2002) confirm the existence of investment 
booms, but find no evidence that the distribution of investment subsequent to a liberalization 
follows the predictions associated with the repricing of systematic risk.  As such, investment 
booms may be more associated with reductions in the risk-free interest rate than with repricing of 
equity risk.  Multinational responses to capital controls and liberalizations can shed light on the 
mechanisms underlying this investment boom by analyzing their investment behavior directly 
and by considering the extent to which borrowing costs are associated with capital controls.  
2.2. The distributional consequences of capital controls  
In addition to the aggregate effects described above, it is possible that capital controls 
distort the composition of investment and firm activity.  Morck, Strangeland and Yeung (1998) 
and Rajan and Zingales (2003) both characterize capital controls as one example of a financial 
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regulation that can have important distributional consequences across firms within the same 
country.  Specifically, they argue that capital controls can favor entrenched firms and that these 
firms then lobby for their preservation.  Johnson and Mitton (2003) demonstrate the nature of 
these distributional consequences by examining how political connections are linked to firm 
performance under capital controls in the case of Malaysia.   
The distributional consequences of capital account policies need not arise from political 
connections alone.  Forbes (2003) shows how smaller firms suffered during the Chilean encaje, 
suggesting that the consequences of these regulations may be quite heterogeneous across firms 
due to access to capital markets.   Similarly, Auguste et al. (2003) consider the use of ADRs to 
facilitate capital flight during a period of capital controls, indicating that the impact of capital 
controls may depend on differential access to avoidance tactics. 
Access to internal capital markets facilitates the evasion of capital controls by 
multinational firms.  Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003) document the extent to which internal 
capital markets permit multinationals firms to substitute parent-provided debt for local 
borrowing in countries with underdeveloped capital markets.  Similarly, Desai, Foley, and 
Forbes (2003) show that multinationals outperform local firms during severe currency crises by 
accessing internal capital markets as they pursue investment opportunities created by 
depreciations.1  Since multinationals may circumvent capital controls through the use of their 
internal markets and these internal markets are not available to all firms, capital controls could 
have significant distributional consequences.  Given the overall importance of foreign direct 
investment to economic growth, as suggested by the findings of Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
understanding the effect of capital controls on the behavior of multinational firms is valuable in 
assessing the economic impact of capital account policies.     
2.3 Capital controls, capital costs and FDI 
The influence of capital controls – and their liberalization – on foreign direct investment 
depends on how controls influence the cost of capital for multinational firms.  Capital controls 
are commonly thought to increase the cost of local borrowing, as in Dooley and Isard (1980), 
                                                 
1 In a similar vein, Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) and Mitton (2002) suggest how cross-country and 
cross-firm variation in responses to corporate governance is associated with differential responses to currency crises. 
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given that these controls, or the expectation of their imposition, prevent international capital 
flows from equalizing interest rates.  Since a considerable fraction of the funding for local 
affiliates of multinational investors typically comes from local loans, higher interest rates 
increase the cost of capital and should be expected to discourage investment.  By comparing the 
borrowing costs of affiliates of the same parent in countries with and without capital controls, it 
is possible to identify the degree to which interest rates respond to capital controls in a manner 
that is not confounded by differences in credit quality or other firm characteristics.  
 In addition to these differences in interest costs, profit repatriation restrictions that 
accompany capital controls can reduce effective returns to foreign investment by preventing 
multinational investors from repatriating their profits to the extent that they would do so in the 
absence of restrictions.  It is useful to consider a simple formalization of this point.  For firms 
investing in countries with capital controls the value of an investment can be expressed as V(K), 
in which K is the stock of capital held by the affiliate.  Higher interest rates in countries with 
capital controls generally imply that V(K) is less than the value of a comparable investment in a 
country without capital controls, but that is not the only impact of capital controls as controls 
also constrain the repatriation behavior of such affiliates.  Following a period in which an 
affiliate earns profits of π , and putting tax considerations aside for simplicity, the affiliate has 
the choice of reinvesting its profits, remitting them as dividends, or using financial or other 
means to relocate the profits to other affiliates or the parent company in non-dividend form, 
possibly by adjusting the prices at which intercompany transactions are booked. 
In the absence of capital controls, dividend repatriation policies would be governed by 
tax considerations and the need to use dividends to control cash flows and incentives within 
multinational firms.2  Let d* denote the firm’s desired level of dividend remittance, and d 
represent dividends actually paid; the affiliate is assumed to incur a cost equal to ( )2*dd −α , 
with 0>α , reflecting tax and organizational costs from imperfectly tailored dividend policies.  
The effect of capital controls on dividend levels is to impose that dividends satisfy dd ≤ , in 
which d  is the affiliate’s maximum permitted repatriation.  Firms also have the ability to use 
various devices to relocate profits outside of affiliates in countries with capital controls, though 
 7
these devices are likewise costly.  Let δ  denote the volume of profits earned by the affiliate in a 
capital control country but reported to be earned outside; the associated cost is given by 2µδ , 
with 0>µ . 
The problem facing the multinational affiliate with previous period capitalization of 1−K  
is then to choose d and δ  to maximize: 
(1)   
[ ]

















The first order conditions corresponding to this maximization are: 














in which λ  is the shadow value associated with the constraint that dd ≤ . 
 Important features of the multinational firm’s reactions to capital controls are evident 
from examination of conditions (2) and (3).  If the repatriation restriction does not bind, then 
0=λ , *dd = , and 0=δ , so ( ) 1=′ KV , and all of the effects of capital controls on 
discouraging local investment come from the associated higher interest rates.  In the more 
realistic case that repatriation restrictions bind, then 0>λ , dd = , and 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 1*11 <−+−=′ ddKV αλ , so 0>δ .  When repatriations restrictions bind, dividend 
remittances are insensitive to changes in desired dividends, and investors relocate some of their 
profits to other jurisdictions.   
                                                                                                                                                             
2 For a discussion of the tax and agency motivations for dividend repatriation policies, see Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2001, 2002). 
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Costs associated with higher local interest rates and regulatory impediments to profit 
repatriations reduce the desirability of investing in countries with capital controls, thereby 
reducing the value of V(K) at any given level of K.  Firms initially capitalize affiliates to the 
point that ( ) 1=′ KV , but given the costs associated with capital controls, the level of K at which 
( ) 1=′ KV  is smaller if a country has capital controls.  The fact that ( ) 1V K′ <  for affiliates 
facing binding repatriation restrictions implies that such affiliates might grow quickly, since a 
fraction of profits is effectively trapped.  It does not follow that these affiliates will grow more 
quickly than others located in countries without capital controls, since firms can moderate 
growth rates with dividend repatriations and profit reallocations, and have incentives to do so 
given the costliness of operations in countries with capital controls.  Hence, in order to measure 
the net impact of capital controls it is necessary to consider their impact on initial sizes of 
affiliates as well as patterns of retained earnings.   
Finally, it is also possible that capital controls actually increase expected returns for 
multinational firms.  Specifically, Aizenman (2002) examines the conditions under which 
macroeconomic volatility can discourage types of foreign direct investment.  Given that one of 
the rationales for capital controls is reduced volatility, it is possible that multinationals respond 
to capital controls with increased investment.  Consequently, the degree to which increased costs 
associated with higher interest rates, repatriation restrictions, and costly evasion technologies are 
offset by reduced volatility remains an open empirical question.  The analysis that follows 
proceeds by directly examining borrowing costs, avoidance behavior, and affiliate sizes in order 
to assess the impact of capital controls on foreign direct investment.   
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics3 
The empirical work presented in section 4 is based on the most comprehensive available 
data on the activities of American multinational firms.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad from 1982 through 1997 provides a panel of 
data on the financial and operating characteristics of U.S. firms operating abroad.  These surveys 
ask reporters to file detailed financial and operating items for each affiliate and information on 
the value of transactions between U.S. parents and their foreign affiliates. The International 
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Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act governs the collection of the data and the Act 
ensures that “use of an individual company’s data for tax, investigative, or regulatory purposes is 
prohibited.”  Willful noncompliance with the Act can result in penalties of up to $10,000 or a 
prison term of one year.  As a result of these assurances and penalties, BEA believes that 
coverage is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high. 
U.S. direct investment abroad is defined as the direct or indirect ownership or control by 
a single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign 
business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business enterprise.  A 
U.S. multinational entity is the combination of a single U.S. legal entity that has made the direct 
investment, called the U.S. parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign 
affiliate.  In order to be considered as a legitimate foreign affiliate, the foreign business 
enterprise should be paying foreign income taxes, have a substantial physical presence abroad, 
have separate financial records, and should take title to the goods it sells and receive revenue 
from the sale.  In order to determine ownership stakes in the presence of indirect ownership, 
BEA determines the percentage of parent ownership at each link and then multiplies these 
percentages to compute the parent’s total effective ownership. 
The foreign affiliate survey forms that U.S. multinational enterprises are required to 
complete vary depending on the year, the size of the affiliate, and the U.S. parent’s percentage of 
ownership of an affiliate.  The most extensive data for the period examined in this study are 
available for 1982, 1989, and 1994, when BEA conducted Benchmark Surveys.  In these years, 
all affiliates with sales, assets, or net income in excess of $3 million in absolute value and their 
parents were required to file extensive reports.  In non-benchmark years between 1982 and 1995, 
exemption levels were higher and less information was collected.4  Although majority owned 
affiliates report many accounting items and information concerning operations each year, 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 This description of the data is drawn from Desai, Foley and Hines (2002). 
4 From 1983-1988, all affiliates with an absolute value of sales, assets, or net income less than $10 million were 
exempt from reporting requirements, and this cutoff increased to $15 million from 1990-1993 and $20 million in 
1995.  BEA uses reported data to estimate universe totals when surveys cover only larger affiliates or when only 
certain affiliates provide information on particular survey forms.  Estimated data is unlikely to have a significant 
impact on the BEA’s published data at the industry or country level as data based on actual reports exceeds 90 
percent of the estimated totals of assets and sales in each of the years between 1982 and 1995.  To avoid working 
with estimated data, only affiliates required to provide all the information associated with a particular analysis are 
considered. 
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minority owned affiliates must only file information about sales, net income, assets, 
employment, employment compensation, and trade with the United States in non-benchmark 
years.  Majority owned affiliates are foreign affiliates in which the combined direct and indirect 
ownership of U.S. persons exceeds 50 percent. BEA collects identifiers linking affiliates through 
time, thereby permitting the creation of a panel. 
 Table 1 displays basic information on the incidence and size of affiliates in the three 
benchmark years – 1982, 1989, and 1994.  In the most recent benchmark year, 20,898 entities are 
covered, with median sales and assets of approximately $14 million.  The bottom panel of Table 
1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the statistical analysis presented in 
section 4.  The parent trade surplus is the ratio of the parent company trade surplus (exports 
minus imports) with its foreign affiliate to total trade (exports plus imports).  Net income is after-
tax income reported in U.S. dollars, and the return on assets is the ratio of net income to the book 
value (in U.S. dollars) of gross assets.  Tax rates are calculated from BEA data by taking the 
ratio of foreign income taxes paid to foreign pretax income for each affiliate, and using the 
medians of these rates as country-level observations for each country and year.5  Mean and 
median country tax rates are equal to approximately 34 percent over the sample period.  Private 
Credit is the ratio of private credit lent by deposit money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000).  Political Risk is the average monthly assessment from the 
International Country Risk Guide, rescaled to lie between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating 
greater risk.6  Similarly, the Rate of Inflation is the contemporaneous percentage change in a host 
country’s GDP deflator. 
 The BEA data also contain information on the interest expense associated with affiliate 
debt, and it is possible to use this information to calculate an affiliate’s average interest rate in a 
year.  Because the data do not contain detailed information on interest rates charged on 
individual loans or on which types of debt are interest-bearing, the analysis uses two estimates of 
                                                 
5 Affiliates with negative net income are excluded for the purposes of calculating country tax rates.  For a more 
comprehensive description of the calculation of affiliate tax rates, see Desai, Foley and Hines (2001).  In particular, 
these income tax rates do not include withholding taxes on cross-border interest payments to related parties, since 
such taxes are endogenous to interest payments and in any case immediately creditable against home-country tax 
liabilities.  Desai and Hines (1999) report that adjusting country tax rates for withholding taxes does not affect the 
estimated impact of taxation on affiliate borrowing, due to the combination of creditability and low withholding tax 
rates on related-party interest payments. 
6 Since Political Risk data for 1982 are unavailable, 1984 values are used in their place.  
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interest rates.  The first measure is the Interest Rate on External Borrowing, which is calculated 
by dividing affiliate interest payments to non-parents by current liabilities and long-term debt 
borrowed from non-parent sources.  This variable has a mean of 4.9 percent.  One of the reasons 
that this average interest rate appears low is that the broad measure of debt used in this 
calculation includes trade credit which is often non-interest bearing.7  The second interest rate is 
the Interest Rate on Non-Trade Account Borrowing, which is the ratio of total interest paid to a 
measure of current liabilities and long term debt that excludes trade accounts and trade notes 
payable.  This alternative interest rate variable has a mean of 7.9 percent.  This variable includes 
interest payments to parents and external sources in the numerator and total debt in the 
denominator. 
Table 2 provides detail on the two measures of capital account restrictions employed in 
the statistical analysis that follows.8  The IMF measure is the one most commonly used in the 
literature and, as documented in Table 2, is one that classifies many countries as having capital 
controls during the 1980s and 1990s.9  The IMF capital control classification is a yes-no 
measure, based on multiple aspects of a country’s capital account restrictions, not all of them 
relevant to multinational firms.  It is useful to consider an alternative to the IMF classification 
that emphasizes restrictions that are important to foreign investors; fortunately, Shatz (2000) 
provides one such measure.  Shatz (2000) details measures of openness to FDI for a sample of 57 
countries along a number of dimensions.10  Two of these are restrictions on capital repatriation 
and restrictions on profit remittance.  Capital account restrictions obtained from these data are 
coded as a dummy variable equal to one if either of the restrictions is rated two or less, indicating 
policies that impose strict time or quantity limits on the ability of affiliates to move funds out of 
the host country. 
                                                 
7 Interest rates are based on current interest payments and are recorded in U.S. dollars.  The currency denomination 
of debt may be important to financial decision making within a multinational firm, but it is impossible to tell from 
the BEA data in which currency debt is formally denominated.  See Kedia and Mazumdar (2003) and Allayannis, 
Brown and Klapper (2003) for analyses of the determinants of the currency denomination of debt. 
8 Table II is limited to countries for which the Shatz measure exists.  Fortunately, these countries are the hosts to the 
vast majority of outbound U.S. foreign direct investment.  
9 The deficiencies in this measure, along with the revised measure, are considered in Eichengreen (2001).   
10 The IMF dummy covers the 1982-1995 period.  Using the tables and text in Shatz (2000), it is possible to create 
the Shatz measure over the same time horizon.  In order to increase the power of tests of the effects of 
liberalizations, we track the use of capital controls in countries that liberalize controls in the years between 1982 and 
1995 through 1997 and use data over the 1982-1997 period. 
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 The comparison between the measures in Table 2 yields some interesting results.11  Any 
country that is considered free of capital controls by the IMF measure is likewise classified as 
free under the Shatz measure.  However, numerous countries classified as restricted by the IMF 
are not considered restricted under the Shatz measure.  In 1990, the correlation between the 
Shatz measure and the IMF measure was 0.30.12 
The middle panel of Table 1 provides another vantage on how these measures differ with 
respect to the activities of U.S. multinationals.  By the IMF measure, nearly half of all U.S. 
multinational affiliates were located in countries with capital controls in 1982, though the 
fraction dropped to 21.0 percent by 1994.  In contrast, 11.3 percent of all U.S. multinational 
affiliates were located in countries that Shatz classifies as imposing capital controls in 1982, a 
figure that falls to 3.1 percent by 1994.  By both measures of capital account restrictions, 
affiliates in countries with capital controls have disproportionately fewer assets and sales and 
greater numbers of employees.  Across all affiliate-year observations, as indicated in the bottom 
panel of Table 1, 8.5 percent of all observations were in countries with capital controls as 
measured by Shatz, while 34.0 percent were in countries with capital controls as measured by the 
IMF. 
4.  Capital Account Restrictions and Foreign Direct Investment 
In order to isolate the impact of capital controls on the performance of American 
multinational firms, this section begins by considering one of the most basic elements of the cost 
of functioning under these regimes - the local borrowing environment.  This analysis has the 
advantage of identifying how interest costs for the same borrower vary because of these regimes.  
This analysis of interest rates is followed by an examination of the degree to which multinational 
firms circumvent capital controls through various mechanisms.  Finally, the section considers the 
overall effect of capital controls by presenting estimates of the impact of capital controls on 
investment levels. 
                                                 
11 This table displays information on capital controls for countries that are covered by both measures.  In addition, 
the Shatz measure covers Taiwan, which imposes capital controls from 1982-1987.  The IMF measure covers a 
sample of more than 150 countries.  Most of those countries in this sample and not the Shatz sample are home to a 
very small number of affiliates. 
12 The so-called Quinn index that was originally employed in Quinn (1997) is not employed here as it was not 
available on a continuous basis and only for two years - 1982 and 1988 – that were in the sample. 
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4.1. Interest rates 
 Table 3 presents estimated coefficients from regressions estimating the determinants of 
interest rates.  The dependent variable in the regressions reported in the first four columns is the 
interest rate paid on loans from unrelated parties.  Interest costs are only collected in benchmark 
years, so the sample includes observations from 1982, 1989, and 1994.  Columns one and two 
offer simple specifications, the independent variables including capital control indicators, 
dummy variables for parent companies, affiliate industries, and years, three powers of log GDP, 
and median total annual compensation per employee paid by American multinationals in 
country-year cells.13  The use of capital controls as measured by the IMF is associated with 2.3 
percent higher interest rates; the use of capital controls as measured by Shatz is associated with 
7.9 percent higher interest rates. 14  Since the sample mean interest rate is just five percent, these 
are sizable effects. 
The regressions reported in columns 3-8 of Table 3 add independent variables in order to 
control for observable affiliate and country attributes that might contribute to interest rate 
differences.  In the regressions reported in columns 3 and 4, greater political riskiness and higher 
rates of local inflation are both associated with higher (dollar-denominated) interest rates, in both 
cases interpretable as reflecting the impact of greater uncertainty over the likelihood and level of 
ultimate repayment.  After controlling for these additional variables, capital controls as measured 
by the IMF are associated with 1.2 percent higher interest rates, while capital controls as 
measured by Shatz are associated with 5.4 percent higher interest rates. 
The regressions presented in columns 1-4 of Table 3 indicate that interest rates are higher 
in countries with capital controls.  It is noteworthy that, since parent company fixed effects are 
included as independent variables, these interest rate effects appear between affiliates of the 
same companies.  This evidence is, however, subject to the limitation that the denominator of the 
interest rate variable is total liabilities, including trade credits on which explicit interest is seldom 
                                                 
13 Studies such as Eichengreen and Mody (2000a,b) examine the determinants of corporate borrowing spreads across 
countries and the impact of differing legal regimes on sovereign borrowing costs.  The alternative of analyzing 
interest rates paid by multinational firms implicitly controls for a host of unobservable factors by comparing interest 
rates faced by the same company in different institutional environments.  The absence of detailed data on affiliate 
borrowing makes it infeasible, however, to incorporate term structure considerations emphasized in papers such as 
Duffee (2002). 
14 All standard errors presented in the tables are clustered at the country-year level.   
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paid.  As a result, measured interest rates are somewhat low and may vary between countries due 
to trade financing practices. 
Columns 5-8 of Table 3 report estimated coefficients from regressions designed to 
address this issue.  The dependent variable is again the interest rate, in this case constructed as 
the ratio of total affiliate interest payments to other current liabilities and long-term debt, 
excluding trade accounts.  The estimated capital market effects obtained using this dependent 
variable, reported in columns five and six, have the same signs and almost exactly the same 
magnitudes as those obtained using the first interest rate variable and reported in columns three 
and four. 
Data limitations make it impossible to measure average interest rates paid to external 
sources when the denominator of the calculated interest rate excludes trade account debt.  It is 
nonetheless possible to evaluate circuitously the difference between interest rates on parent loans 
and local loans, and the effect of capital controls on this difference, using a measure of interest 
rates that does not include trade account debt.  Columns seven and eight of Table 3 present 
estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent variable is the same as that in the 
regressions reported in columns five and six, but adds two independent variables: the share of 
debt from non-parent sources,15 and the interaction between this share and measures of capital 
controls.  If the cost of capital is higher in countries imposing capital controls, then the 
coefficient on the interaction between the share of debt from local sources and capital control 
measures should be positive, reflecting the extent of the difference. 
The results indicate that greater borrowing from non-parent sources is associated with 
higher interest rates in countries imposing capital controls.  The 0.0314 coefficient on the 
interaction of the IMF capital control measure and the share of debt borrowed from non-parent 
sources, reported in column 7, implies that interest rates on external debt (measured exclusive of 
trade credit) are 3.1 percent higher in countries with capital controls.  The 0.0619 coefficient 
reported in column eight implies that interest rates are 6.2 percent higher in countries with capital 
controls as measured by Shatz.  Since the mean interest rate on non-trade account borrowing is 
7.7 percent, these are sizable effects and consistent with the earlier analysis. 
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4.2. Profit extraction 
Multinational firms whose affiliates are located in countries with capital controls have 
incentives to find creative ways to extract profits for deployment elsewhere.  Profits can be 
relocated by changing the locations in which they are reported, and by changing patterns of profit 
remittances much as multinational firms respond to taxation.   
4.2.1. Transfer pricing 
It is possible for multinational firms to sidestep repatriation restrictions by manipulating 
the prices at which foreign affiliates trade with their American parent companies, since 
overinvoicing parent exports to affiliates, or underinvoicing parent imports from affiliates, serves 
to relocate profits.  The same tactics reduce total tax liabilities when used to relocate taxable 
income from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.  Governments typically insist that firms use arm’s 
length prices in trade with other members of the same controlled group, but such prices are 
notoriously difficult to enforce, particularly when (as is often the case for multinational firms) 
traded goods have unique characteristics that make it difficult to identify perfectly comparable 
items.  As a result, affiliates located in countries with high tax rates or binding repatriation 
controls are likely to run larger trade deficits (or smaller trade surpluses) with their parent 
companies than would otherwise be the case, since firms have incentives to structure and record 
such trades in ways that relocate as many profits as possible.  There is an extensive literature that 
analyzes the reported profitability patterns of American multinational firms, finding that 
affiliates located in high-tax countries tend to report lower profit rates than do those located in 
low-tax countries.16   
Table 4 presents results of specifications similar to those used to study the impact of 
taxes in which the dependent variable is the rate of return on affiliate equity.  The sample covers 
all years from 1982 to 1995.  In a smoothly functioning competitive market the expected rate of 
return should be the same everywhere, but in a setting in which firms systematically understate 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 The share of debt from non-parent sources equals one minus the ratio of current liabilities and long-term debt 
owed to the parent to total current liabilities and long-term debt. 
16 See, for example, Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994), and the literature surveyed by Hines (1999). 
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profits earned in high-tax countries and in countries with capital controls, there should be a 
negative association between profit rates and tax rates or the use of capital controls. 
The –0.2075 coefficient reported in column one of Table 4 implies that ten percent higher 
tax rates are associated with 2.1 percent lower profit rates, controlling for parent company, 
affiliate industry, year, three powers of log GDP, and median employee compensation paid by 
U.S. multinationals.  The magnitude of this effect is similar to that reported elsewhere in the 
transfer-pricing literature, and corresponds to commonly observed avoidance methods.  The 
regression reported in column two indicates that capital controls as measured by the IMF have 
insignificant effects on reported profits, whereas the –0.0472 coefficient in the regression 
reported in column three indicates that affiliates located in countries with capital controls as 
measured by Shatz have 4.7 percent lower reported profit rates.  Together with the estimated -
0.1959 coefficient on local tax rates, the capital control coefficient implies that the imposition of 
capital controls has the same (negative) effect on reported profits as would a 24.1 percent higher 
tax rate. 
Columns four and five of Table 4 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which 
the sample is restricted to affiliates in countries that remove capital controls (as defined by 
Shatz) during the sample period, and the regressions include affiliate fixed effects, thereby 
estimating the impact of capital controls on the basis only of changes induced by their removal.17 
This necessarily entails a much smaller sample size than that used in the regressions reported in 
columns 1-3.  The estimated tax effects, which are likewise estimated based on changes, are 
comparable in sign and magnitude to those appearing in columns 1-3.  The 0.0823 coefficient on 
the post liberalization dummy variable in the regression reported in column five implies that the 
removal of capital controls is associated with 8.2 percent higher affiliate profit rates, though this 
effect is not statistically significant.  In order to assess the reasonableness of the estimated impact 
of capital controls on reported profitability, it is useful to consider more directly their impact on 
transfer pricing. 
The regressions presented in Table 5 analyze the effect of capital controls on a measure 
of the trade balance of U.S. parents with affiliates in particular industry/country/year cells.  The 
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dependent variable in these specifications is a ratio, the numerator of which is the difference 
between total U.S.-parent exports to their foreign affiliates and total U.S.-parent imports from 
foreign affiliates; the denominator is the sum of these exports and imports.  This variable is 
calculated by summing trade between parents and affiliates in country/industry/year cells over 
the 1982-1995 period, and omitting cells for which there is zero trade (and for which the ratio 
has a denominator of zero).  Clausing (2001) develops this measure at an aggregate country level 
and employs it to explore the extent to which firms relocate profits in response to local tax 
incentives. 
Tax rate differences encourage American parent companies to run larger trade surpluses 
with their affiliates in high-tax countries than with those in low-tax countries, since doing so 
reduces total tax burdens.  The estimated positive coefficients on the tax rate variable in the 
regressions reported in Table 5 are consistent with these incentives, and indeed, are consistent 
with the aggregate country results reported by Clausing (2001).  In the regression reported in 
column one, ten percent higher local tax rates are associated with 3.7 percent greater parent trade 
surpluses, controlling for industry and year fixed effects, three powers of log GDP, and median 
employee compensation paid by U.S. multinationals.  The estimated tax effect is little changed 
by the introduction of capital control measures in the regressions reported in columns 2-3.  
Capital controls as measured by the IMF are associated with 3.2 percent greater parent trade 
surpluses, though this effect is marginally significant; the Shatz capital control variable is 
associated with a larger 7.1 percent impact on parent trade surpluses. 
It is instructive to relate the trade effect of capital controls as captured by the Shatz 
variable to the profit shifting results above.  The 0.0708 and 0.3793 coefficients in the regression 
reported in column three of Table 5 together imply that capital controls have the same trade 
surplus impact as would 18.7 percent higher local tax rates.  Viewed differently, the 0.0708 
coefficient together with the $240 billion of reported 1994 trade between U.S. parent firms and 
their foreign affiliates implies that parent trade surpluses with their affiliates would be elevated 
by $17 billion if all foreign countries imposed capital controls.  The aggregate owner’s equity in 
U.S.-owned foreign affiliates was $819 billion in the same year, so the –0.0472 coefficient from 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 Liberalizing countries include Argentina (1990), Brazil (1992), Chile (1992), Colombia (1992), Ecuador (1993), 
Egypt (1992), Greece (1987), Peru (1993), Philippines (1992), Taiwan (1988), and Venezuela (1990). 
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column three in Table 4 implies that aggregate reported affiliate profits would be reduced by $39 
billion if all countries adopted capital controls.  Hence the observable effect on trade with parent 
companies accounts for slightly less than half of the measured impact of capital controls on 
affiliate profitability.  Since affiliates are able to use financing devices, trade with related parties 
other than parent companies, and other methods to relocate reported profits, the evidence of 
capital control effects on profitability and trade surpluses is quite consistent. 
4.2.2. Dividend repatriations 
Firms that are restricted in their ability to remit dividends commonly find that the shadow 
value of local retained earnings is less than the value of capital deployed elsewhere, so they have 
incentives to remove profits if possible.  Capital controls typically include repatriation 
restrictions that operate on annual bases, thereby indirectly encouraging affiliates to remit 
dividends to their parent companies every year, lest low-cost repatriation opportunities otherwise 
be lost.  For example, Brazilian affiliates in the 1980s were subject to 40 percent or higher tax 
rates on repatriations averaging more than 13 percent of registered investment over any three-
year period.18  In order to investigate the extent to which firms respond to this incentive, the 
regressions reported in Table 6 are logit specifications in which the dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to one if an affiliate pays a dividend to its parent in a particular year, and zero 
otherwise.  The sample again covers the 1982-1995 period.  Country tax rates are included as 
independent variables (since higher tax rates generally reduce the cost of paying dividends to 
American parent companies), as are parent and year fixed effects, three powers of log GDP, and 
median employee compensation paid by U.S. multinationals. 
The regression reported in column one of Table 6 indicates that higher country tax rates 
and higher affiliate return on assets are associated with significantly greater likelihoods of paying 
dividends.  The regressions reported in columns 2-3 of Table 6 indicate that the chances of 
paying a dividend are significantly higher in countries with capital controls as measured both by 
the IMF and by Shatz.  The 0.3589 coefficient in column three implies that the imposition of 
capital controls (as measured by Shatz) has the same effect on the likelihood of paying dividends 
as does a 7.7 percent higher return on assets, or a 35 percent higher local tax rate.  The estimated 
                                                 
18 See Bentley (1985) for further details. 
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coefficients imply that an affiliate with mean values of the other independent variables is 9.8 
percent more likely to pay a dividend if it is located in a country imposing capital controls than it 
would be if located in a country that does not control capital flows,19 a sizable effect given that 
such an average affiliate has only a 53.3 percent chance of paying a dividend at all. 
Columns 4-5 of Table 6 report estimated coefficients from regressions in which the 
sample is restricted to affiliates in countries that remove capital controls, and the inclusion of 
affiliate fixed effects implies that the impact of capital controls is identified on the basis of 
changes induced by their removal. The sample size is therefore considerably smaller than the 
samples used for the estimation reported in columns 1-3.  The estimated tax effects reported in 
columns 4-5, which are likewise estimated based on changes, are somewhat larger than those 
reported in columns 1-3, while the estimated impact of changes in return on assets is of 
comparable size.  The –0.5701 coefficient reported in column five indicates that the removal of 
capital controls is associated with significantly reduced likelihood of remitting dividends to 
parent companies.  The estimated impact of capital account liberalization is equal in magnitude 
to that of 14 percent lower return on assets or 25 percent lower tax rates and at mean values of 
other independent variables implies that the removal of capital controls reduces by 11.6 percent 
the chance that an affiliate will pay a dividend. 
Firms with incentives to repatriate funds on a regular basis are likely to have dividend 
streams that are less responsive to changing conditions than are remittances by unconstrained 
affiliates.  In order to test this possibility, it is convenient to estimate a standard Lintner model of 
dividend payments by foreign affiliates,20 in which current dividends are regressed on current 
after-tax income and lagged dividends.  The concept behind the Lintner model is that target 
dividend levels are functions of current income, but that actual dividends adjust only slowly to 
desired dividends.  The estimated adjustment parameter is equal to one minus the coefficient on 
lagged dividends, while the estimated steady state dividend payout ratio equals the ratio of the 
coefficient on net income and the adjustment parameter. 
                                                 
19 This implied marginal effect of capital controls is estimated from a model that includes among its independent 
variables only one power of GDP, since the inclusion of two additional powers of GDP creates such multicolinearity 
that marginal effects become very difficult to estimate. 
20 For an elaboration of the Lintner dividend model, and its application to remittances by foreign affiliates, see 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2001, 2002). 
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The results indicate that dividend repatriations adjust more slowly to income changes in 
capital control countries than they do in other countries.  Columns 1-6 of Table 7 report 
estimated coefficients from Lintner specifications run on the whole sample with and without 
parent and affiliate fixed effects.  The results are similar to those in Desai, Foley and Hines 
(2001), the estimated 0.2588 coefficient on lagged dividends in column 1 for example implying 
an adjustment parameter of 0.74.  Columns 3-4 report specifications adding interactions of net 
income and lagged dividends with dummy variables indicating capital controls as measured by 
the IMF; these interactions permit the effects of net income and lagged dividends to differ 
between affiliates located in countries with and without capital controls.  The positive estimated 
coefficients on the interaction of lagged dividends and the IMF dummy imply that dividend 
remittances from affiliates in countries with capital controls adjust more slowly to income 
changes than do remittances from affiliates in other countries, though the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
Columns 5-6 of Table 7 report estimates using the Shatz measure of capital controls, and 
in these specifications, adjustment parameters and implied steady-state payout ratios differ 
sharply between affiliates located in capital control countries and affiliates located elsewhere.  
The estimates reported in column 5 imply that affiliates in capital control countries have 
adjustment parameters of 0.46, while those in countries without capital controls have adjustment 
parameters of 0.79.  Affiliates in capital control countries have steady-state payout ratios of 65.4 
percent, compared with payout ratios of 54 percent for other affiliates.  Since countries imposing 
capital controls typically limit the size of permitted dividend repatriations, it is not surprising that 
there is little difference in implied steady-state payout ratios.  What is more telling is that 
dividend repatriations respond more sluggishly to income changes in countries with capital 
controls, which is consistent with behavior that is driven by a desire to extract profits. 
Columns 7-10 of Table 7 report coefficients from dividend payout equations estimated on 
the sample of affiliates located in countries that liberalize their capital account restrictions during 
the sample period.  The estimated effects of net income and lagged dividends are similar to those 
reported in columns 1-6, while the interaction of the post liberalization dummy variable and 
lagged dividends is negative, implying that dividends exhibit considerably less persistence in 
post-liberalization periods.  The results reported in columns 9 and 10 imply much smaller 
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dividend adjustment parameters in periods without capital controls, which is consistent with the 
evidence reported in Table 6 and with the incentives created by repatriation restrictions.  
Furthermore, the regularity of dividend payments from affiliates in countries with capital 
controls is unlikely to be a function simply of omitted variables responsible for the introduction 
of the controls. 
4.3. Investment 
 If local borrowing rates were unaffected by capital controls and capital control evasion 
technologies were costless, investment by multinational firms need not be affected by capital 
controls.  As demonstrated above, however, the macroeconomic effects of capital controls 
include elevating interest rates to levels that may make local debt finance unattractive.  Similarly, 
Tables 4-7 indicate that firms engage in avoidance strategies that are comparable to the strategies 
they employ in response to significant differences in tax rates.  Given the various other tax and 
non-tax motivations that would otherwise guide dividend repatriation policies and intercompany 
income allocation, these actions are likely to be quite costly.  Consequently, it is useful to 
measure the extent to which capital controls are accompanied by reduced foreign investment 
levels. 
Table 8 presents estimates of the effects of capital controls on one measure of the 
magnitude of foreign direct investment by U.S. multinationals, the size of affiliates at first 
appearance.  The sample consists of affiliates the first time that they appear in the BEA data 
between 1983-1995, so each affiliate is included just once.  The specifications reported in 
columns 1-3 include dummy variables for multinational parents, affiliate industry, and years, as 
well as three powers of log GDP and median employee compensation paid by U.S. 
multinationals.  The –0.3020 coefficient on country tax rates implies that ten percent higher tax 
rates are associated with three percent smaller affiliates, an effect and magnitude that is 
consistent with the evidence reported in the literature on tax effects on foreign direct investment.  
The –0.1590 coefficient in column 2 of Table 8 indicates that affiliate assets, at first appearance, 
are 15.9 percent smaller in countries with capital controls as measured by the IMF than they are 
in countries without capital controls.  Estimates using the Shatz capital control measure, reported 
in column 3, imply that affiliates in capital control countries are 12.7 percent smaller. 
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Columns 4-5 of Table 8 present estimates of the determinants of asset size changes for 
affiliates in countries that liberalize their capital account restrictions.  These regressions include 
observations of affiliates not just at their first appearances but over the entire sample period, 
though the sample is limited to affiliates located in countries that remove capital controls.  The 
specifications include affiliate fixed effects and year dummies as independent variables, so the 
effects of tax rates and capital controls are identified from changes rather than levels.  The 
estimated tax rate effects are paradoxically positive, though the 0.1562 coefficient on the post 
liberalization dummy variable in the regression reported in column five is quite consistent with 
the magnitudes of the estimated effects reported in columns 2-3. 
The results reported in Table 8 imply that affiliates located in countries with capital 
controls are smaller relative to affiliates located in other countries.  As discussed above, it is 
possible that this initial size is ultimately offset by higher growth through forced retention of 
earnings.  In order to examine this possibility it is useful to consider whether affiliates retain 
greater earnings in countries with capital controls.  While other results indicate that 
multinationals respond to capital controls by smoothing dividends and shifting profits, it is 
possible that these efforts are incomplete, leaving affiliates in countries with capital controls to 
grow ultimately to large sizes. 
Table 9 presents regressions that track this dynamic, using data from the 1982, 1989, and 
1994 Benchmark Surveys.  The dependent variable in these regressions is the ratio of retained 
earnings to total affiliate assets, and the independent variables include local tax rates, dummy 
variables for multinational parents, affiliate industries, and years, three powers of log GDP, and 
median employee compensation paid by U.S. multinationals.  Capital controls are associated 
with reduced retained earnings in the specifications reported in columns 2 and 3, the –0.0661 
coefficient in column three corresponding to 6.6 percent lower ratios of retained earnings to total 
assets.  Since the mean ratio of retained earnings to total assets is 17.9 percent, it follows that this 
is a sizable effect, and that multinational affiliates in countries with capital controls not only 




This paper offers evidence that the foreign affiliates of American multinational firms 
circumvent capital controls by regularizing dividend remittances and relocating profits.  Evading 
capital controls in this way is costly given the tax and other business considerations that would 
otherwise guide dividend repatriations and trade between related parties.  Countries imposing 
capital controls have significantly higher interest rates than do otherwise-similar countries 
without capital controls.  Multinational firms contemplating new investments in countries with 
capital controls therefore face high costs of local borrowing and significant costs associated with 
the actions necessary to avoid the impact of capital controls, and as a result, their investment 
levels are significantly reduced.  Capital account liberalizations are associated with reversals in 
these patterns.  While this paper evaluates the activities of foreign affiliates of American 
multinational firms, the costs associated with capital controls undoubtedly discourage many 
potential investors from establishing affiliates in the first place. 
Since countries imposing capital controls differ in many ways from those that do not, it is 
infeasible to control for all the relevant differences in evaluating the impact of capital controls.  
As a result, the smaller asset demands of American affiliates in countries imposing capital 
controls might stem either from the capital controls themselves or from the economic conditions 
that motivate governments to impose the controls.  Details of the behavior of multinational firms 
offer the prospect of distinguishing these interpretations, since some aspects of this behavior are 
unlikely to be a function of the factors that motivate governments to impose the controls.  
Evidence of the effects of capital controls on profit reallocation and dividend repatriation implies 
that firms behave in a manner that is consistent with higher local costs of capital, suggesting that 
the observed effects on assets and retained earnings reflect the impact of policies and not merely 
the conditions responsible for the policies.   
In addition to providing a window on the aggregate effects of capital controls and 
liberalizations on investment behavior, the evidence on how multinationals employ internal 
markets to circumvent these controls suggests that capital controls have distributional 
consequences.  Firms without access to internal capital markets are likely to be hardest hit by 
capital account restrictions.  Consequently, capital controls not only raise the costs of capital 
faced by smaller domestic firms but also likely disadvantage them relative to larger multinational 
firms against which they compete.
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1982 1989 1994
Number of Affiliates 18,579                    18,899                    20,898                    
Median Sales 10,875                    12,788                    14,079                    
Median Assets 9,823                      13,120                    14,385                    
Median Employees 79                           64                           68                           
Share of Activity in Countries with 
Capital Controls Measured by:
IMF 46.9% 40.4% 21.0%
Shatz 11.3% 9.8% 3.1%
IMF 38.2% 28.4% 11.6%
Shatz 6.4% 4.7% 1.1%
IMF 35.9% 30.0% 13.5%
Shatz 6.3% 6.4% 1.2%
IMF 47.8% 40.8% 28.7%
Shatz 14.2% 13.1% 3.8%
Mean Median St. Dev
Parent Trade Surplus 0.5133 0.9762 0.6976
Net Income/Owners' Equity 0.1655 0.1456 0.2704
Dividend Dummy 0.2946 0.0000 0.4559
Dividends 5,024                      -                          32,445                    
Net Income 6,222                      1,501                      21,614                    
Return on Assets 0.0565 0.0519 0.1985
Log of Assets 10.1245 10.0236 1.4741
Country Tax Rate 0.3367 0.3487 0.1266
IMF Capital Control Dummy 0.3441 0.0000 0.4751
Shatz Capital Control Dummy 0.0845 0.0000 0.2781
Retained Earnings/Total Assets 0.1794 0.1227 0.3367
Interest Rate on External Borrowing 0.0493 0.0163 0.0922
Interest Rate on Non-Trade Account Borrowing 0.0765 0.0299 0.1322
Share of Debt from Non-Parent Sources 0.8148 0.9705 0.2796
Private Credit 0.7927 0.7945 0.4478
Political Risk 0.2359 0.2050 0.1215
Rate of Inflation 0.5572 0.0571 3.1066
Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise.  The Interest Rate on 
External Borrowing is the ratio of the affiliate interest payments to non-parents to current liabilities and long-term debt borrowed from non-parent sources.  The Interest 
Rate on Non-Trade Account Borrowing is the ratio of total affiliate interest payments to current liabilities and long-term debt, excluding trade accounts and trade notes 
payable.  Share of Debt from Non-Parent Sources is the share of affiliate current liabilities and long-term debt owed to lenders other than the affiliate's parent.  Private 
Credit is the ratio of private credit lent by deposit money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000).   Political Risk is the annual average 
of the monthly index of political risk presented in the International Country Risk Guide, rescaled to lie between 0 and 1 with higher numbers indicating higher risks.  
Rate of Inflation is the contemporaneous percentage change in the GDP deflator of an affiliate's host country. 
Table 1






Descriptive Statistics for Variables
Notes: The top panel provides the number count, median sales, median assets and median employees for all affiliates of U.S. multinationals in the sample for 1982, 
1989, 1994.  In 1982, 1989, and 1994, Benchmark Surveys were conducted and, consequently, the cutoff for inclusion in the sample is lower than other years as 
discussed in the text.  The top panel also provides the share of affiliates, assets, sales and employees in countries with capital controls as characterized by the IMF and 
Shatz measures discussed in the text.  The bottom panel reports descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the regression analysis.  Parent trade surplus is equal 
to the difference between parent exports to the affiliate and parent imports from the affiliate divided by the sum of these two values.  Net income, owners' equity, 
dividends, assets, and retained earnings are all measured in thousands of nominal U.S. dollars.  The mean and standard deviation of Net Income/Owners' Equity are 
calculated using analytical weights where weights are set equal to owners' equity.  Dividend Dummy is equal to one if an affiliate pays a dividend in a particular year 
and zero otherwise.  Return on Assets is the ratio of net income to assets.  Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country.  The IMF Capital 
IMF Measure           
(covers 1982-1995)
Shatz Measure         
(covers 1982-1995)
IMF Measure         
(covers 1982-1995)
Shatz Measure       
(covers 1982-1995)
Argentina 1982-1992 1982-1989 Italy 1982-1989
Australia 1982-1984 Jamaica 1982-1995
Austria 1982-1990 Japan
Bahamas 1982-1995 Korea 1982-1995
Barbados 1982-1995 Malaysia
Belgium-Luxembourg Mexico 1982-1995
Brazil 1982-1995 1982-1991 Netherlands
Canada Netherlands Antilles 1982-1995
Chile 1982-1995 1982-1991 New Zealand 1982-1983
China 1982-1995 1982-1995 Nigeria 1982-1995 1982-1995
Colombia 1982-1995 1982-1991 Norway 1982-1994
Costa Rica 1982-1994 Panama
Denmark 1982-1987 Peru 1984-1992 1982-1992
Dominican Republic 1982-1995 1982-1995 Philippines 1982-1995 1982-1991
Ecuador 1986-1987, 1993-1994 1982-1992 Portugal 1982-1992
Egypt 1982-1995 1982-1991 Saudi Arabia
Finland 1982-1990 Singapore
France 1982-1989 South Africa 1982-1995
Germany Spain 1982-1993
Greece 1982-1995 1982-1986 Sweden 1982-1992
Guatemala 1982-1988 Switzerland none in 1992-1995, other years NA
Honduras 1982-1992 Thailand 1982-1995
Hong Kong Trinidad and Tobago 1982-1993
India 1982-1995 1982-1995 Turkey 1982-1995
Indonesia United Arab Emirates
Ireland 1982-1991 United Kingdom
Israel 1982-1995 Venezuela 1984-1995 1982-1989
Notes: The table provides the years for which the IMF and Shatz characterize countries as having capital controls, as discussed in the text, for those countries studied by Shatz. 
Capital Control Measure
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Capital Control Measures, for those countries measured by Shatz
Capital Control Measure
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 3.5830 12.2232 0.7601 8.8616 6.2761 17.3656 5.4139 16.6440
(3.2431) (5.3339) (4.4529) (5.9529) (4.2771) (6.5060) (4.3553) (6.4980)
Country tax rate -0.0719 -0.0461 -0.0570 -0.0227 -0.0600 -0.0262
(0.0611) (0.0499) (0.0519) (0.0427) (0.0539) (0.0443)
Private Credit -0.0084 -0.0068 -0.0042 -0.0010 -0.0052 -0.0023
(0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0094) (0.0102) (0.0094) (0.0100)
Political Risk 0.1189 0.0655 0.1641 0.1255 0.1746 0.1284
(0.0469) (0.0342) (0.0502) (0.0420) (0.0516) (0.0428)
Rate of inflation 0.0056 0.0050 0.0050 0.0045 0.0050 0.0044
(0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0014)
IMF Capital Control Dummy 0.0229 0.0117 0.0160 -0.0104
(0.0076) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0078)
Shatz Captial Control Dummy 0.0785 0.0544 0.0542 0.0073







Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
GDP and wage controls? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 20,378   20,357   18,413   18,553   18,473    18,549    17,982    18,081    
R-Squared 0.2053 0.2382 0.2531 0.2671 0.2699 0.2729 0.2721 0.2763
that correct for clustering of errors across observations in country/year cells are presented in parentheses.
Interest Rate on Non-Trade Account 
Borrowing (from all sources)Interest Rate on External Borrowing
Capital Controls and Local Borrowing Rates
Table 3
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the ratio of the value of affiliate interest payments to non-parents to current liabilities and long-term debt borrowed 
from non-parent sources; in columns 5-8, the dependent variable is the ratio of total affiliate interest payments to current liabilities and long-term debt, excluding trade 
accounts and trade notes payable.  All regressions are estimated by ordinary least squares and include parent, industry, and year fixed effects.  Country Tax Rate is the 
median tax rate in an affiliate's host country.  Private Credit is the ratio of private credit lent by deposit money banks to GDP, as provided in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine (2000).  Political Risk is the annual average of the monthly index of political risk presented in the International Country Risk Guide, rescaled to lie between 0 
and 1 with higher numbers indicating higher risks.  Rate of Inflation is the contemporaneous percentage change in the GDP deflator of an affiliate's host country.  The 
IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise.  Standard errors
Share of Debt from Non-
Parent Sources
Share of Debt from Non-
Parent Sources Interacted with 
IMF Capital Control Dummy
Share of Debt from Non-
Parent Sources Interacted with 
Shatz Capital Control Dummy
Parent, industry, and year 
fixed effects?
Dependent Variable: Net 
Income/Owners' Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -35.4662 -18.6025 -45.2557 0.1511 0.1237
(8.4114) (8.0517) (11.6224) (0.0340) (0.0368)
-0.2075 -0.1598 -0.1959 -0.2173 -0.1341
(0.0457) (0.0435) (0.0470) (0.0970) (0.1051)
IMF Capital Control Dummy 0.0050
(0.0109)
Shatz Capital Control Dummy -0.0472
(0.0202)
Post Liberalization Dummy 0.0823
(0.0482)
Parent, Industry, and Year Fixed 
Effects? Y Y Y N N
GDP and Wage Controls? Y Y Y N N
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? N N N Y Y
No. of Obs. 128,368      108,942      108,657      12,867        12,867        
R-Squared 0.2286 0.2104 0.2150 0.6502 0.6520
Notes: The dependent variable in each specification is the ratio of net income to owners' equity.  The analysis uses analytic weights equal to owners equity to 
transform the specifications in a way that is equivalent to multiplying through by owners' equity.  Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host 
country.  The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero 
otherwise.  Specification (1)-(3) include parent, industry, and year fixed effects and observations for all affiliate years, and as well as three powers of log GDP 
and the log of the median annual compensation per employee paid by affiliates in a particular country and year.  Specifications (4) and (5) include affiliate 
and year fixed effects and observations from countries that undergo capital control liberalizations.  The post liberalization dummy is equal to one in the year 




Full Sample Liberalizing Countries
Capital Controls and Transfer Pricing Activities of U.S. Multinationals
(1) (2) (3)




IMF Capital Control Dummy 0.0322
(0.0175)
Shatz Capital Control Dummy 0.0708
(0.0331)
Industry, and Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y
GDP and Wage Controls? Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 24,162                 20,446                  19,937                   
R-Squared 0.2023 0.2066 0.2039
The dependent variable in each specification is the difference between parent exports to the affiliate and parent imports 
from the affiliate divided by the sum of these two values, calculated using data for each industry in each country and 
year.  Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country.  The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the 
Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise.  Each 
specification includes industry and year fixed effects as well as three powers of log GDP and the log of the median 
annual compensation per employee paid by affiliates in a particular country and year. Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors that correct for clustering across country/year cells are presented in parentheses.
Country Tax Rate
Dependent Variable: Parent Trade Surplus
Table 5
Capital Controls and Transfer Pricing Activity by U.S. Multinationals, as Measured by Trade 
Surpluses
Dependent Variable: Dummy Equal to 
One if Dividend Payment Made
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.9505 1.1526 1.0245 2.5956 2.2556
(0.0817) (0.0898) (0.0940) (0.3990) (0.4089)
IMF Capital Control Dummy 0.0890
(0.0196)
Shatz Capital Control Dummy 0.3589
(0.0323)
Post Liberalization Dummy -0.5701
(0.1483)
Return on Assets 4.5648 4.5676 4.6543 3.9830 4.0272
(0.0641) (0.0676) (0.0686) (0.2431) (0.2441)
Parent/Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y N N
GDP and Wage Controls? Y Y Y N N
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? N N N Y Y
No. of Obs. 97,061           86,458           85,985           7,556             7,556               
Log Likelihood -43,235 -38,390 -38,022 -2,854 -2,847
Notes: The dependent variable in each specification is a dummy that is equal to one if an affiliate makes a dividend payment in a particular year and 
zero if it does not. Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country.  The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital 
Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise.  Return on assets is the ratio of affiliate net 
income to assets.  Specification (1)-(3) include Parent/Year fixed effects and observations for all affiliate years, and as well as three powers of log 
GDP and the log of the median annual compensation per employee paid by affiliates in a particular country and year.  Specifications (4) and (5) 
include affiliate and year fixed effects and observations from countries that undergo capital control liberalizations.  The post liberalization dummy is 
equal to one in the year of and each of the years following liberalizations.  Standard errors are presented in parenthesess.





Dependent Variable: Dividend Paid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Constant 364.5 1337.3 417.8 1371.2 429.9 1842.8 747.8 1743.8 562.0 1502.6
(94.1) (146.2) (74.6) (122.2) (94.0) (171.3) (196.8) (250.4) (172.1) (289.1)
Net Income 0.4122 0.3567 0.3969 0.3385 0.4244 0.3174 0.2980 0.2023 0.2615 0.1446
(0.0209) (0.0233) (0.0215) (0.0250) (0.0232) (0.0259) (0.0471) (0.0369) (0.0442) (0.0589)
0.2588 0.0822 0.2382 0.0280 0.2141 0.0047 0.2590 0.1195 0.5133 0.3449













Parent Fixed Effects? Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Affiliate Fixed Effects? N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
No. of Obs. 87,339     87,339     74,482     74,482     56,689     56,689     8,552      8,552      8,552      8,552      
R-Squared 0.3836 0.5157 0.3702 0.5005 0.3735 0.5430 0.4885 0.6088 0.5159 0.6212
0.5210 0.3483 0.5400 0.3189 0.4022 0.2298 0.3702 0.2492
0.5354 0.3302 0.6539 0.2737 0.5372 0.2207
0.7618 0.9720 0.7859 0.9953 0.7410 0.8805 0.8053 0.9216
0.6997 0.8602 0.4612 0.7153 0.4867 0.6551
Full Sample
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is the dollar value of dividend payments by majority-owned affiliates to parents.  Net Income is the after-foreign tax net income of the affiliate.  Lagged Dividends is the 
dollar value of dividend payments by the affiliate in the previous year.  The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero 
otherwise.  Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 present OLS specifications with parent fixed effects.  Columns 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 present OLS specifications with affiliate fixed effects.  The sample used in specifications 1-6 
includes all affiliates and the sample in specifications 7-10 includes only affiliates in countries that liberalize their capital controls.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Liberalizing Countries
The Impact of Capital Controls on the Dividend Policy of U.S. Multinationals
Without Controls
With Controls
Post Liberalization Dummy 
Interacted with Net Income
Post Liberalization Dummy 
Interacted with Lagged Dividend
Table 7
Adjustment Parameter Without Controls
With Controls
Lagged Dividends
IMF Capital Control Dummy 
Interacted with Net Income
IMF Capital Control Dummy 
Interacted with Lagged Dividends
Shatz Capital Control Dummy 
Interacted with Net Income
Shatz Capital Control Dummy 
Interacted with Lagged Dividend
Payout ratio
Dependent Variable: Log of Affiliate 
Assets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 107.7197 106.5692 131.5939 9.6327 9.6018
(24.2568) (25.2007) (34.8195) (0.0659) (0.0710)
-0.3020 -0.3558 -0.4689 0.3926 0.4896





Post Liberalization Dummy 0.1562
(0.0607)
Parent, Industry, and Year Fixed 
Effects? Y Y Y N N
GNP Controls? Y Y Y N N
Affiliate and Year Fixed Effects? N N N Y Y
No. of Obs. 22,015           18,623           18,507           17,810           17,810           
R-Squared 0.4959 0.4819 0.4847 0.8700 0.8703
Notes: The dependent variable in each specification is the log of affiliate assets.  Country Tax Rate is the median tax rate in an affiliate's host country.  
The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero 
otherwise.  Specification (1)-(3) include parent, industry, and year fixed effects and observations for the first appearce of all affiliates subsequent to 
1982, as well as three powers of log GDP and the log of the median annual compensation per employee paid by affiliates in a particular country and 
year.  Specifications (4) and (5) include affiliate and year fixed effects and observations from countries that undergo capital control liberalizations.  The 
post liberalization dummy is equal to one in the year of and each of the years following liberalizations.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
that correct for clustering across country/year cells are presented in parentheses.
The Impact of Capital Controls on Multinational Affiliate Size
Table 8
IMF Capital Control Dummy





Constant 10.4160 8.8870 2.9613
(8.4270) (8.0428) (13.2301)
Country Tax Rate -0.0926 -0.0376 -0.1310
(0.0676) (0.0593) (0.0769)
IMF Capital Control Dummy -0.0626
(0.0165)
Shatz Capital Control Dummy -0.0661
(0.0184)
Parent, Industry, and Year Fixed Effects? Y Y Y
GDP and Wage Controls? Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 52,388           49,979           49,695           
R-Squared 0.2128 0.2160 0.2170
Table 9
The Impact of Capital Controls on the Retained Earnings of Multinational Affiliates 
Notes: The dependent variable in each specification is the ratio of retained earnings to assets.  Country Tax Rate is the 
median tax rate in an affiliate's host country.  The IMF Capital Control Dummy and the Shatz Capital Control Dummy are 
dummies equal to one if a country imposes capital controls and zero otherwise.  All specification include parent, industry, 
and year fixed effects and observations for all benchmark years, as well as three powers of log GDP and the log of the 
median annual compensation per employee paid by affiliates in a particular country and year.  Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors that correct for clustering across country/year cells are presented in parentheses.
Dependent Variable: Retained Earnings/Total Assets
